Título: | Regulating the Revolving Door |
Autores: | Transparency International |
Tipo de documento: | texto impreso |
Editorial: | Transparency International, 2019-09-25T09:00:50Z |
Nota general: |
TI Working Paper 6 1 8 With permission of the license/copyright holder |
Idiomas: | Inglés |
Palabras clave: | Globethics.net collections , Ethics collections , Institutional collections , Globethics.net Library Submissions , Business Ethics , Transparency International Collection , Corruption and Transparency Collection |
Resumen: |
"The term ‘revolving door’ refers to the movement of individuals back and forth between public office and private companies,3 in order to exploit their period of service to the benefit of their current employer. According to data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), over 75 per cent of new entrants in senior positions in the UK government came from outside the public service, who after a period of four to five years, sought to return to the private sector or the not-for-profit world.4 Some sectors that have been particularly prone to the revolving door phenomenon include health, agriculture, finance, energy and defence. The ’revolving door’5 can move in two directions: From government to the private sector (i.e. post-public employment):6 Public officials (elected or appointed) and civil servants move to lucrative private sector positions, where they may use their government experience and connections to unfairly benefit their new employer. For example, there is a trend in many capitals of former lawmakers and executive branch officials becoming paid lobbyists, using inside connections to advance the interests of their corporate clients. Public officials may even favour certain companies or sectors in their decisions while they are in office in the hope of landing a job in the corporate world once they exit government. From the private sector to government (i.e. pre-employment):7 The appointment of corporate executives to key public offices and posts in government raises the possibility of a pro-business bias in policy formulation and regulatory enforcement. Another risk comes from lobbyists who leave consultancies, thinktanks or trade associations to join the government in an advisory or decisionmaking capacity." |
En línea: | 1998-6408 |
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