Título: | [Global Corruption Report 2007] Bribes,Punishment and Judicial Immunity |
Autores: | Dal Bo, Ernesto ; Dal Bo, Pedro ; Di Tella, Rafael |
Tipo de documento: | texto impreso |
Editorial: | Transparency International, 2019-09-25T09:01:15Z |
Dimensiones: | Pages: 5 |
Nota general: | With permission of the license/copyright holder |
Idiomas: | Inglés |
Palabras clave: | Globethics.net collections , Institutional collections , Ethics collections , Globethics.net Library Submissions , Transparency International Collection , Corruption and Transparency Collection |
Resumen: |
"During the height of the Argentine crisis of 2002, amid crowds of furious protesters shouting ‘que se vayan todos’ (Spanish for ‘let them all go’) against a political class perceived as deeply corrupt and self-serving, the IMF requested that the country pass an immunity law for central bank directors. Since this would extend the protection already enjoyed by politicians from judicial investigations of misconduct to members of an institution at the centre of the country’s financial crisis, this appeared to be an incomprehensible proposal. In the timid debate that followed, it was argued that, while possibly detrimental to fighting corruption, such laws were necessary for the sound functioning of the financial system. For those seriously concerned with reducing corruption, however, this presents a legitimate question: Are immunity laws an obstacle in reducing corruption? The short answer we offer in Dal Bó et al. (2006) is that not only do immunity laws not hinder the fight against corruption, but that, under some conditions, they actually help. To understand this, we must first accept that influence is carried out not only through bribes and lobbying, but also through threats and punishment."(pg 302) |
En línea: | 9780521700702 |
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