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Resumen:
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Some studies have recently examined the effect of closeness on the probability of observing the monotonicity paradox in three-candidate elections under Scoring Elimination Rules. It has been shown that the frequency of such paradox significantly increases as elections become more closely contested. In this paper we consider the effect of closeness on one of the most studied notions in Social Choice Theory: The election of the Condorcet winner, i.e., the candidate who defeats any other opponent in pairwise majority comparisons, when she exists. To be more concrete, we use the well known concept of the Condorcet efficiency, that is, the conditional probability that a voting rule will elect the Condorcet winner, given that such a candidate exists. Our results, based on the Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) assumption, show that closeness has also a significant effect on the Condorcet efficiency of different voting rules in the class of Scoring and Scoring Elimination Rules.
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