| Título: | Cheating for the common good in a macroeconomic policy game |
| Autores: | Álvarez González, Francisco ; Deissenberg, Christophe |
| Tipo de documento: | texto impreso |
| Editorial: | Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico. Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 2001 |
| Dimensiones: | application/pdf |
| Nota general: | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| Idiomas: | |
| Palabras clave: | Estado = Publicado , Tipo = Documento de trabajo o Informe técnico |
| Resumen: |
Se presenta un juego repetido que modeliza la interacción entre un gobierno optimizador y el sector privado, representado por un continuo de agentes heterogéneos y atomísticos. Abstract: This paper presents a simple repeated-game model of interaction between an optimizing government and the private sector. Two polar cases are considered: (a) the private sector is represented by a single agent; and (b) there is a continuum of heterogenous atomistic private agents. In both cases, the government starts each repetition by making a non-binding announcement about its future actions. The players have complete and perfect information, with one exception: the private agents do not know whether or not the government will act as announced. Thus, each private agent i either behaves with probability ?i as if it trusted the announcement, or plays with probability 1 ? ?i as a Stackelberg leader. After observing the reaction of the private sector, the government |
| En línea: | https://eprints.ucm.es/id/eprint/6788/1/0104.pdf |
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